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INTRODUCTION 
 Consider the following hypothetical. Police officers conduct a law-
ful search of a house belonging to a suspected drug dealer. During 
the search, the police escort the suspect and two other occupants—a 
male and a female—outside. Officers place the suspect into the 
backseat of a police cruiser and then separate and handcuff the two 
occupants. 
 A few minutes later, a detective approaches the female occupant 
while she is still handcuffed and begins to question her. He assures 
her that she is not under arrest and that the restraints are only for 
safety. What starts off as an ordinary identification inquiry leads to 
more investigatory questions, and eventually, she makes an incrimi-
nating statement. While the female occupant is being questioned, 
another detective approaches the suspect, who is still in the backseat 
of the police cruiser, and begins to question him. Eventually, he, too, 
provides incriminating information. 
 After officers finish questioning the suspect and the female occu-
pant, they release the male occupant from handcuffs. The police 
begin to ask him a few identification questions. Suddenly, the male 
occupant starts to pull something out of his pocket—presumably his 
driver’s license to prove his identification—and the police draw their 
weapons. They order him to lie flat on the ground, and with their 
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tance and feedback; and the editors of the Florida State University Law Review for their 
expert editing and thoughtful suggestions. 
844  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42:843 
 
weapons still drawn, one of the officers pats him down while another 
asks if he has any weapons on him. The male occupant responds that 
his weapon is not on him and that it is back in the house.  
 At no time do the police read any of the three individuals their 
Miranda rights.1 Are any of them considered to be in custody for 
purposes of Miranda at any time in the hypothetical? Many courts 
would vary on this analysis but would likely arrive at the same con-
clusion: all three individuals were in custody at the time of the 
questioning and therefore were entitled to Miranda rights. Howev-
er, most of those courts would also find that the application of the 
handcuffs, the placement of the suspect into the backseat of the po-
lice cruiser, and the officers’ drawing of weapons are not dispositive 
factors; instead, each is only one factor among several to consider in 
custody determinations. 
 The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides 
that “[n]o person shall be . . . compelled in any criminal case to be a 
witness against himself . . . .”2 It was not until Miranda v. Arizona, 
however, that the United States Supreme Court concluded that the 
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination is guaranteed 
outside of court proceedings and that procedural safeguards are 
necessary to protect this constitutional privilege during inherently 
coercive custodial interrogations.3 The Court would later come to 
define “custodial interrogation”—discussed in greater length in Part 
I of this Note—as an “interrogation” of an individual who is taken 
into “custody.”4  
 This Note will focus primarily on “custody,” its development 
through the common law, and the particular coercive actions taken 
by law enforcement that are commonly associated with formal ar-
rest—or arrest-like restraints. Courts have consistently held that ar-
rest-like restraints, such as those described in the hypothetical, do 
not necessarily render a suspect in custody for purposes of Miranda.5 
This assertion is flawed in many respects and would strike a reason-
able person as rather odd, not to mention that it is contrary to the 
                                                                                                                                 
 1. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966) (“Prior to any questioning, the 
person must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does 
make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an 
attorney, either retained or appointed.”). 
 2. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 3. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444, 467 (“[T]here can be no doubt that the Fifth 
Amendment privilege is available outside of criminal court proceedings and serves to pro-
tect persons in all settings in which their freedom of action is curtailed in any significant 
way from being compelled to incriminate themselves.”). 
 4. See Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300-01 (1980) (holding that “Miranda 
safeguards come into play whenever a person in custody is subjected to either express 
questioning or its functional equivalent.”). 
 5. See infra Part II. 
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purposes behind Miranda. If a suspect has been subjected to these or 
other arrest-like restraints, it is more likely that he or she is “in cus-
tody” for purposes of Miranda, yet an exception to the general rule 
may be available that still allows for the admissibility of his or her 
statements. It is also possible for a suspect to be taken out of custody 
if the arrest-like restraint has been removed prior to any questioning. 
 Part I of this Note explains the legal developments that led to the 
current test for custodial interrogation. The Court has come to dis-
tinguish custody and arrest, interpreting custody as being more than 
just the physical restraint on the freedom of movement associated 
with arrest and including the circumstances surrounding the interro-
gation.6 Part II demonstrates how federal and state courts have ap-
plied, under various interpretations, the test for custody. Part III 
proposes a bright-line rule governing arrest-like restraints and ex-
plains how the current exceptions to Miranda remedy any issues 
posed by a bright-line rule, such as over- and under-inclusiveness. 
I.   INTRODUCTION TO CUSTODIAL INTERROGATION 
 Part I.A provides a brief overview of the decisions that have ulti-
mately led to the current test for custody under Miranda. It is im-
portant to discuss Fourth Amendment jurisprudence,7 as it plays a 
significant role in custody determinations. Acknowledging this im-
portance, Part I.B discusses the development of certain cases in the 
Fourth Amendment context that have impacted Fifth Amendment 
jurisprudence, and it further stresses the important distinctions be-
tween custody in the Fifth and Fourth Amendment contexts.  
A.   Miranda and Its Progeny 
 The landmark decision of Miranda v. Arizona8 represented the 
beginning of greater protection for the rights of suspects during po-
lice investigations. The decision stood for the proposition that the 
prosecution may not introduce statements made by a criminal de-
fendant during a custodial interrogation unless the prosecution can 
demonstrate that procedural safeguards were employed to apprise 
the defendant of his rights prior to any questioning and that after 
                                                                                                                                 
 6. See Howes v. Fields, 132 S. Ct. 1181, 1189 (2012). 
 7. See generally U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not 
be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things 
to be seized.”). 
 8. Miranda was an aggregate decision of four separate cases, each one involving an 
individual who had been questioned by police after being deprived of his freedom of move-
ment in a significant way without first being apprised of his rights. See Miranda, 384 U.S. 
at 444, 491-99. 
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such warning was given, the defendant made a knowing and intelli-
gent waiver.9 Chief Justice Warren, writing for the Court, explained 
that a suspect must be informed that he has the right to remain si-
lent, that any statement he makes may be admissible in court, that 
he has the right to legal counsel both before and during questioning, 
and that the government will appoint him counsel if he cannot afford 
it.10 The suspect must be afforded the opportunity to exercise any of 
these rights throughout the interrogation, and if he chooses to do so, 
the police must scrupulously honor his invocation.11 The Court recog-
nized that the modern practice of custodial interrogation could be 
psychologically coercive, rather than just physical, and the four cases 
before it in Miranda illustrated how such practice had the potential 
to elicit involuntary confessions.12 
 The Court also held that the Fifth Amendment privilege against 
self-incrimination applies to areas outside of court proceedings and 
extends to all settings where an individual’s freedom of movement is 
curtailed in any significant way.13 However, the Court failed to iden-
tify the circumstances in which an individual’s freedom of movement 
is curtailed in a significant way. In the cases addressed in the Mi-
randa decision, there was very little doubt that the individual de-
fendants were in custody and that their incriminating statements 
had been the results of direct questioning.14 The Court later elaborat-
ed in Rhode Island v. Innis, noting that Miranda warnings are re-
quired when an individual is taken into custody and is subjected to 
interrogation, or more specifically, “express questioning or its func-
tional equivalent.”15 When analyzing whether interrogation has oc-
curred, the Court will not only examine the express questioning, it 
will also examine whether the police should have known that their 
words and actions were reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating 
response from the defendant.16 
 In the years following the Miranda decision, custody in the Fifth 
Amendment context was presumed when a suspect’s freedom to leave 
was restricted in any way.17 In California v. Beheler, the Court nar-
                                                                                                                                 
 9. Id. at 444, 479. The Court has further established that information unknown to a 
suspect has no bearing on whether he “knowingly” waived his Miranda rights, even if that 
information would have changed his decision to waive. See Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 
422 (1986). 
 10. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467-70. 
 11. See id. at 444-45. 
 12. See id. at 448.  
 13. Id. at 467. 
 14. Leslie A. Lunney, The Erosion of Miranda: Stare Decisis Consequences, 48 CATH. 
U. L. REV. 727, 753-54, 768 (1999). 
 15. Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300-01 (1980). 
 16. Id. at 301. 
 17. See Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 494-95 (1977). 
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rowly construed the test for custody as whether, under the totality of 
the circumstances, there had been “a ‘formal arrest or restraint on 
freedom of movement’ of the degree associated with a formal ar-
rest.”18 The rationale behind this decision was that every interview of 
a suspect by a police officer will naturally carry certain coercive as-
pects, “simply by virtue of the fact that the police officer is part of a 
law enforcement system which may ultimately cause the suspect to 
be charged with a crime.”19 The Court alluded to the fact that this 
narrow test would not be the only focus when determining whether a 
suspect was in custody but that it would be the “ultimate inquiry.”20 
 The Court modified the Beheler test for custody in Thompson v. 
Keohane, focusing on the added inquiry of whether “a reasonable per-
son [would] have felt he or she was not at liberty to terminate the 
interrogation and leave.”21 The Court reiterated that the “ultimate 
inquiry” still rested on that of the original Beheler test: whether free-
dom of movement had been restricted to the degree of formal arrest.22 
 Beheler remained the test for nearly three decades, and courts 
remained divided on what constituted “restraint on freedom of 
movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest.”23 In 2012, 
the Court reexamined the test for custody in Howes v. Fields and 
found that “custody” is simply a term of art used to specify the cir-
cumstances under which the danger of coercion is likely to be pre-
sent.24 Howes involved Randall Fields, a prisoner who was serving a 
sentence in a Michigan jail and who was believed to have engaged 
in sexual conduct with a child before he came to prison.25 Police in-
terviewed Fields in a conference room where they told him he was 
free to leave and return to his cell; they did not restrain him, and 
although the police were armed, weapons were never drawn. 26 
Fields confessed during the interview after being confronted with 
the allegations.27  
 Justice Alito, writing for the majority, expressed that the Keohane 
inquiry of whether a reasonable person would have felt free to leave 
                                                                                                                                 
 18. California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125 (1983) (quoting Oregon v. Mathiason, 
429 U.S. 492, 495 (1977)). 
 19. Id. at 1124. 
 20. Id. at 1125. 
 21. Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 112 (1995). 
 22. Id. 
 23. Beheler, 463 U.S. at 1125 (quoting Mathiason, 429 U.S. at 495) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 24. Howes v. Fields, 132 S. Ct. 1181, 1189 (2012). 
 25. Id. at 1185. 
 26. Id. at 1186. 
 27. Id. 
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is the initial step for determining whether a person is in custody.28 
This requires a court to examine the circumstances surrounding the 
interrogation, considering all relevant factors, such as location, dura-
tion, the use of physical restraints, whether the suspect was permit-
ted to leave after questioning, and the statements made during the 
interview.29 The Court explained that not all restrictions on the free-
dom of movement would amount to custody.30 In fact, restraint on 
freedom of movement “identifies only a necessary and not a sufficient 
condition for Miranda custody.”31 It is the restraint on freedom of 
movement coupled with the same inherently coercive pressures as 
the type of station-house questioning present in Miranda that 
amounts to Fifth Amendment custody.32  
 It is not certain how much the Howes test for custody will impact 
the overall analyses of both federal and state courts in determining 
custody. However, the underlying rationale established in Howes—
that restriction on the freedom of movement is a necessary, but not a 
sufficient, factor, and that the overall coerciveness of the interroga-
tion is the main focus—only strengthens the argument for finding 
custody in almost every case where arrest-like restraints are present.  
B.   Terry Stops and Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence 
 Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has been vastly intertwined 
with Miranda and Fifth Amendment jurisprudence. Unsurprisingly, 
only two years after the Warren Court decided Miranda and shifted 
the scales in favor of protecting the rights of suspects, the Court de-
livered another landmark decision in Terry v. Ohio, shifting the 
scales back in favor of crime control.33 In Terry, the Court held that 
where a police officer has a reasonable and articulable suspicion that 
criminal activity is occurring in his presence, it is reasonable for him 
to stop and temporarily detain the suspect until his suspicion has 
been dispelled.34 Terry also provided that an officer who reasonably 
believes that a suspect is armed and dangerous may conduct a lim-
ited search, or “frisk,” of the suspect’s outer garments for the purpose 
of confiscating any weapons that may be used to harm him or oth-
ers. 35  Both the “stop”—a warrantless seizure—and the “frisk”—a 
                                                                                                                                 
 28. Id. at 1189.  
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. at 1190 (quoting Maryland v. Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98, 112 (2010)) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted). 
 32. See id. at 1189-90. 
 33. 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
 34. Id. at 30. 
 35. Id. 
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warrantless search—are deemed reasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment.36 The holding in Terry struck a balance between the 
competing interests of individual Fourth Amendment liberties and 
effective crime prevention and public safety.37  
 The Court expanded the Terry doctrine to traffic stops in Berkemer 
v. McCarty.38 Justice Marshall, writing for the majority, explained 
that an ordinary traffic stop was different from a stationhouse inter-
rogation in many respects, particularly duration and intimidation.39 
Berkermer began to draw some of the most important distinctions 
between Fourth and Fifth Amendment jurisprudence. Although a 
motorist’s freedom of movement is curtailed during a traffic stop, the 
atmosphere surrounding the stop is much less coercive than the 
kinds of interrogation at issue in Miranda.40 The motorist in a traffic 
stop has been “seized” of his person for purposes of the Fourth 
Amendment; however, he is not in custody for purposes of Miranda.41 
This is not to say that a traffic stop cannot elevate into a custodial 
stop, which would warrant full protections to the motorist under Mi-
randa.42 Berkemer led to the expansion of Terry, which some courts 
have come to interpret as standing for the proposition that Miranda 
warnings are almost never required to be given during an investiga-
tory stop,43 further contributing to the confusion over when a suspect 
is considered to be in custody. 
 The Court’s decision in Howes aptly pointed out the significant 
difference between custody in the Fourth Amendment context and 
custody in the Miranda context.44 The Court recognized that Berke-
mer declined to extend the protections of Miranda to routine traffic 
stops because the detention was nonthreatening, relatively brief, and 
unlikely to raise the same concerns regarding coerciveness present in 
Miranda.45 It is this subtle difference that weighs so heavily in favor 
of courts finding Miranda custody when a suspect is subjected to ar-
rest-like restraints. Keohane modified the Beheler test, adding the 
additional inquiry of whether a reasonable person would have felt 
free to leave.46 Howes took a less formalistic approach by introducing 
                                                                                                                                 
 36. See id. at 30-31. 
 37. Id. at 22-24. 
 38. 468 U.S. 420, 439-40 (1984). 
 39. Id. at 437-38. 
 40. See id. at 438-39. 
 41. See id. at 436-37, 441. 
 42. See id. at 440. 
 43. See Katherine M. Swift, Drawing a Line Between Terry and Miranda: The Degree 
and Duration of Restraint, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 1075, 1083-84 (2006). 
 44. See Howes v. Fields, 132 S. Ct. 1181, 1190 (2012). 
 45. See id. at 1189-90. 
 46. See Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 112 (1995).  
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a more subjective analysis with relevant factors that take into ac-
count the circumstances surrounding the actual interrogation.47 It is 
unlikely that a driver or passenger would feel free to leave during a 
traffic stop, for doing so would be a crime.48 Freedom of movement is 
restrained significantly during traffic stops—regardless of whether 
arrest-like restraints are present—but given the inherent coercive-
ness associated with arrest-like restraints, the degree of intimidation 
is substantially higher when they are present. 
 It is not to say that the use of arrest-like restraints during a lawful 
Terry stop would be unreasonable; nor would a bright-line rule estab-
lishing custody where arrest-like restraints are employed make such 
actions impermissible in the Miranda context.49 To the contrary, the 
courts have time and again affirmed the use of reasonable force during 
an investigatory stop.50 It is the potential for coercion when such ac-
tions are taken during interrogation that raises serious concerns.51 
II.   VARIOUS INTERPRETATIONS OF CUSTODY AND ITS 
APPLICATION TO ARREST-LIKE RESTRAINTS 
 This Part considers the various interpretations of Miranda custo-
dy as applied to arrest-like restraints across both federal and state 
jurisdictions. The vast majority of jurisdictions apply a “totality of 
the circumstances” test when considering whether a suspect is in 
custody. While many of those jurisdictions consider arrest-like re-
straints to be only one of several factors in determining whether a 
suspect is in custody, it is one that often weighs heavily in favor of 
finding custody. 
                                                                                                                                 
 47. See Howes, 132 S. Ct. at 1189. 
 48. See id. at 1190.  
 49. Courts require a considerable amount of coercion before finding that a lawful Ter-
ry stop has elevated into a “de facto” arrest. Wayne A. Logan, An Exception Swallows a 
Rule: Police Authority to Search Incident to Arrest, 19 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 381, 416-17 
(2001). Courts grant a significant amount of deference under Terry’s framework, often find-
ing that handcuffing, drawing weapons, or placing suspects in the back of a cop car, even 
for extended periods, do not individually or collectively amount to a Fourth Amendment 
violation. See id. at 417.  
 50. See, e.g., United States v. Merkley, 988 F.2d 1062 (10th Cir. 1993); United States 
v. Clipper, 973 F.2d 944 (D.C. Cir. 1992); United States v. Miller, 974 F.2d 953 (8th Cir. 
1992); United States v. Lechuga, 925 F.2d 1035 (7th Cir. 1991); United States v. Hastamo-
rir, 881 F.2d 1551 (11th Cir. 1989).  
 51. See Brooke Shapiro, The Invisible Prison: Reconciling the Constitutional Doctrines 
of Coercive Terry Stops and Miranda Custody, 26 J. CIV. RTS. & ECON. DEV. 479 (2012), for 
a more detailed analysis on how the constitutional doctrines of Terry and Miranda interact 
and present issues for courts on clearly articulating a definition of custody in both the 
Fourth and Fifth Amendment contexts. 
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A.   Federal Courts 
 The federal courts have varied in their interpretations of custody 
as applied to cases involving arrest-like restraints since the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Beheler and, even more recently, since its decision 
in Howes. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals briefly addressed 
whether subjecting a suspect to arrest-like restraints rises to the lev-
el of custody for purposes of Miranda.52 Leshuk involved two men 
who were discovered to have been growing marijuana in a rural area 
in West Virginia. 53  Although arrest-like restraints were not em-
ployed, the court discussed in dicta that “drawing weapons, handcuff-
ing a suspect, placing a suspect in a patrol car for questioning, or us-
ing or threatening to use force does not necessarily elevate a lawful 
stop into a custodial arrest for Miranda purposes.”54 
 In United States v. Kim, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals af-
firmed a lower court’s finding that custody was present where a sus-
pect had been surrounded by police and questioned for an hour, de-
spite the location of the questioning being her own business.55 In 
Kim, Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) investigators obtained evi-
dence that the suspect, Insook Kim, was selling large quantities of 
pseudoephedrine, a primary chemical ingredient in the production of 
methamphetamine, from her store.56 An investigator went to Kim’s 
store and informed her of the consequences of her sales of large quan-
tities of pseudoephedrine.57 Eight months later, investigators set up a 
controlled purchase.58 After Kim’s employee sold to the undercover 
cop, police entered the premises with a search warrant and hand-
cuffed Kim’s son, who was managing the store.59 Kim, who was at 
home at the time, drove to the store when she was unable to reach 
her son by phone.60  
 When Kim arrived, the police allowed her to enter the store but 
immediately sat her down and started questioning her.61 Kim was 
never handcuffed but at least two officers sat or stood around her 
throughout the interview, which she claimed made her feel sur-
rounded.62 At no time during the interview was Kim read her Miran-
                                                                                                                                 
 52. See United States v. Leshuk, 65 F.3d 1105 (4th Cir. 1995). 
 53. Id. at 1106. 
 54. Id. at 1109-10 (citing United States v. Moore, 817 F.2d 1105, 1108 (4th Cir. 1987); 
United States v. Manbeck, 744 F.2d 360, 377-80 (4th Cir. 1984)). 
 55. 292 F.3d 969, 971 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. at 971-72.  
 62. Id. at 972. 
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da rights or told that she was free to leave.63 Kim made several in-
criminating statements during the interview, which lasted close to an 
hour.64 Kim was arrested and charged with possession and distribu-
tion of pseudoephedrine with knowledge and reasonable cause to be-
lieve that it would be used to manufacture methamphetamine.65 The 
district court granted Kim’s motion to suppress the statements made 
during the interview.66 
 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit analyzed custody under the modified 
Beheler test of whether Kim was subjected to “formal arrest or re-
straint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with a for-
mal arrest”67 considering the objective circumstances of the interro-
gation and whether “a reasonable person would believe that he or she 
was not free to leave.”68 The court noted several factors that would 
likely be relevant in the analysis, such as “ ‘(1) the language used to 
summon the individual; (2) the extent to which the defendant is con-
fronted with evidence of guilt; (3) the physical surroundings of the 
interrogation; (4) the duration of the detention; and (5) the degree of 
pressure applied to detain the individual.’ ”69 The court suggested 
that this list is not exclusive.70 
 The decision in Kim is unique to this Note because it is the only 
discussed decision in which the custody inquiry did not involve a tra-
ditional arrest-like restraint (e.g., handcuffs, being placed in the back 
of police car, weapons drawn). If the courts were to adopt this Note’s 
proposed bright-line rule of presuming custody in cases involving ar-
rest-like restraints, it might still be uncertain on which side of that 
bright-line rule Kim would fall. There are, perhaps, several other po-
tentially coercive restraints that could be considered arrest-like. If an 
officer tells a suspect that he is under arrest and proceeds to inter-
view him without applying any physical restraints or providing Mi-
randa warnings, would the act of saying “you’re under arrest” be con-
sidered an arrest-like restraint? It is likely that the result will be the 
same whether we determine that the suspect was subjected to arrest-
like restraints and apply the proposed bright-line rule, or whether we 
analyze it under any of the totality of the circumstances tests. Hypo-
thetically, even if the Ninth Circuit had determined that being sur-
                                                                                                                                 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. at 973 (quoting Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 322 (1994)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 68. Id. at 973-74 (quoting United States v. Beraun-Panez, 812 F.2d 578, 580 (9th 
Cir. 1987)). 
 69. Id. at 974 (quoting United States v. Hayden, 260 F.3d 1062, 1066 (9th Cir. 2001)). 
 70. See id. 
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rounded by police during the interrogation was not an arrest-like re-
straint, the circumstances surrounding Kim’s interrogation were 
such that a reasonable person would not have felt at liberty to termi-
nate the interview and leave, thus constituting custody under 
Howes.71 
 In United States v. Newton, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals 
directly examined whether a suspect who was placed in handcuffs 
was in custody for purposes of Miranda.72 Sewn Newton, a three-time 
convicted felon, had agreed as part of his parole to allow his parole 
officer to visit his home and to search both his person and his resi-
dence.73 Police received a call from a social worker who informed 
them that, according to Newton’s mother with whom he resided, 
Newton had threatened to kill her and her husband and that he kept 
a gun in a shoe box by the door of the home.74 Newton’s parole officer 
was contacted and instructed to conduct a “safety search” of the 
apartment.75 Six officers, including Newton’s parole officer; went to 
the apartment; placed Newton, who was dressed in only his under-
wear, in handcuffs without advising him of his Miranda rights; and 
proceeded to search the premises.76 Police brought Newton back into 
the apartment, sat him down, and questioned him about any contra-
band he may have, to which Newton responded he only had a .22 cal-
iber automatic firearm in a box in the corner of that room.77 After po-
lice found the weapon, Newton was placed under arrest.78 
 In analyzing whether Newton was in custody for purposes of Mi-
randa, the Second Circuit turned to the free-to-leave inquiry from 
Beheler.79 It noted that where a person is subjected to arrest-like re-
straints, specific, coercive pressures do not need to be proven to es-
tablish Miranda custody—coercive pressures are assumed. 80  The 
court further elaborated that the objective standard for custody does 
not require police to administer warnings on the basis of a self-
assessment that their own actions are coercive, but rather, it is un-
derstood that that formal arrest or arrest-like restraints will trigger 
                                                                                                                                 
 71. This hypothetical considers how the Ninth Circuit would analyze this exact case 
today under the prevailing view of Howes and, of course, after reading this Note and adopt-
ing its argument. As it may become apparent from reading this Note, none of this is cur-
rently the case. 
 72. 369 F.3d 659, 669-77 (2d Cir. 2004). 
 73. Id. at 663. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. at 663-64. 
 78. Id. at 664. 
 79. Id. at 670. 
 80. Id.  
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that requirement.81  The court acknowledged that “[h]andcuffs are 
generally recognized as a hallmark of a formal arrest.”82 Although the 
police advised Newton that he was not under arrest and that the re-
straints were being used to ensure officer safety, these statements 
did not negate the coerciveness.83 The court ultimately found that 
while placing Newton in handcuffs to conduct the search was reason-
able under the Fourth Amendment, he was in custody for purposes of 
Miranda.84 
 The application of Miranda custody to arrest-like restraints con-
tinues to vary throughout the federal courts. In Burlew v. Hedgpeth, 
the Ninth Circuit found that a suspect who was placed into the back 
of a patrol car and then questioned was not in custody.85 In Hedgpeth, 
Deputy Sheriff James Beaupre was surveying a suspected drug-
manufacturing house when the suspect in the case, Robert Burlew, 
drove by in an “erratic” manner. 86  Beaupre pulled Burlew over, 
searched him, and placed him into the patrol vehicle for further in-
vestigation.87 Although Burlew was informed that he was not under 
arrest and was not placed in handcuffs, he was still in the back of 
Beaupre’s patrol car when he made incriminating statements in re-
sponse to a direct question.88 Despite this custodial-like atmosphere 
and direct questioning, the court held that the lower court had not 
unreasonably applied federal law in weighing the factors and in find-
ing that Burlew was not in custody at the time he made the incrimi-
nating statements.89 Such a decision appears to be at odds with the 
underlying purpose of Miranda’s safeguards. Although Burlew was 
not in handcuffs, being placed into the back of a patrol car increases 
the potential for coercion. 
 In reaching custody determinations, courts typically apply a total-
ity of the circumstances test. The factors that a court may consider 
vary from circuit to circuit. In United States v. Cowan, the Eighth 
Circuit Court of Appeals applied a non-exhaustive list of six factors 
when it considered whether a suspect was in custody.90 Cowan in-
volved police officers in Davenport, Iowa, who executed a warrant to 
search an apartment in which they suspected crack cocaine was be-
                                                                                                                                 
 81. Id. at 672. 
 82. Id. at 676 (citing New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 665 (1984)). 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. at 677. 
 85. 448 F. App’x 663, 664 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 86. Burlew v. Hedgpeth, No. CIV S-08-2009 LKK CHS P., 2009 WL 2045455, at *1 
(E.D. Cal. July 9, 2009) (unpublished opinion). 
 87. Id. at *1-2. 
 88. Burlew, 448 F. App’x at 664. 
 89. Id. at 665. 
 90. 674 F.3d 947, 957 (8th Cir. 2012). 
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ing sold.91 During the search, the officers discovered, and subsequent-
ly handcuffed, eight adults, including Mauriosantana Cowan.92 One 
of the officers frisked Cowan and asked him whether he had identifi-
cation and what brought him to the apartment.93 Cowan claimed that 
he had traveled by bus from Chicago; however, a further frisk of 
Cowan by the police officer revealed car keys.94 When the police of-
ficer confronted Cowan about why he had car keys, Cowan responded 
that he was keeping them from his girlfriend. 95  After the police 
searched the apartment and discovered crack cocaine in several loca-
tions, they removed the handcuffs from Cowan and informed him 
that he could leave, so long as his keys did not match any of the vehi-
cles parked outside of the apartment.96 One of the officers pressed 
Cowan’s key fob while outside of the apartment, which set off a car 
alarm. 97  The police handcuffed Cowan and brought out a drug-
sniffing canine, which alerted the police to the presence of drugs in 
Cowan’s car.98 The police searched the vehicle, discovered crack co-
caine, and brought Cowan back inside the apartment, at which point 
Cowan was read Miranda warnings and subsequently confessed.99 
 The Eighth Circuit interpreted custody as whether a reasonable 
person would have felt free to terminate the interrogation and 
leave.100 The court considered a non-exhaustive list of six factors in 
its analysis of whether Cowan was in custody, which included the 
following: (1) whether police told the suspect “that the questioning 
was voluntary,” the suspect could leave or ask the officers to do so, 
“or that the suspect was not considered under arrest”; (2) whether 
the suspect’s movement was restrained during the questioning; 
(3) “whether the suspect initiated contact with authorities or volun-
tarily acquiesced to official requests to respond to questions”; 
(4) whether police used “strong arm tactics or deceptive stratagems” 
during questioning; (5) “whether the atmosphere of the questioning 
was police dominated”; and (6) whether the suspect was arrested at 
the end of the questioning.101  
 The court emphasized that the ultimate inquiry depended on 
whether the suspect’s freedom to leave was restricted in any way, as 
                                                                                                                                 
 91. Id. at 951. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. at 951. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. at 951-52. 
 100. Id. at 957. 
 101. Id. (quoting United States v. Griffin, 922 F.2d 1343, 1349 (8th Cir. 1990)). 
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opposed to whether questioning occurred in a coercive or police-
dominated environment. 102  That rationale seems inapposite when 
considering the Supreme Court has clearly expressed that restriction 
on freedom of movement is a necessary but insufficient condition for 
establishing custody and that the focus should be on the circum-
stances surrounding the interrogation.103 Despite this, the court ap-
plied the factors to find that Cowan was in custody, noting that “a 
reasonable person in Cowan’s position would not have felt free to end 
the questioning and leave.”104 
 In a more recent decision, United States v. Richardson, the U.S. 
District Court for the District of Columbia discussed but failed to ad-
dress whether handcuffs created a custodial effect for purposes of Mi-
randa.105 Fourteen law enforcement agents of the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation and the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police De-
partment executed a search warrant at an apartment in southeast 
D.C. in search of drugs.106 After announcing themselves and receiving 
no response, the police forcibly entered the apartment.107 Once inside, 
they again identified themselves and ordered all inhabitants to re-
veal themselves, and the suspects, Marsha Richardson and William 
Hill, complied.108  The two were searched and placed in handcuffs 
while the police proceeded to search the apartment for weapons.109 
The two suspects, still in handcuffs, were placed in the living room.110 
Hill, being the suspected target of a larger drug conspiracy, was ap-
proached by one of the detectives soon thereafter.111 The detective 
informed Hill of the authorized search warrant, his knowledge of 
Hill’s connection to another suspect that was being investigated, and 
Hill’s transactions with that suspect. 112  A different detective ap-
                                                                                                                                 
 102. Id. (quoting United States v. Martinez, 462 F.3d 903, 909 (8th Cir. 2006)). 
 103. See Howes v. Fields, 132 S. Ct. 1181, 1189-90 (2012) (“We have ‘decline[d] to ac-
cord talismanic power’ to the freedom-of-movement inquiry . . . and have instead asked the 
additional question whether the relevant environment presents the same inherently coer-
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Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 437 (1984))); see also Maryland v. Shatzer, 559 U.S. 
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 105. Criminal No. 14-CR-0018 (KBJ), 2014 WL 1410890, at *1 (D.D.C. Apr. 14, 2014). 
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proached Richardson minutes later to retrieve information for identi-
fication, which Richardson calmly provided.113 
 Twenty minutes after the initial interaction with Richardson, the 
police located a .38 caliber pistol in a black purse covered by a pink 
towel.114 The police first questioned Hill, who denied ownership of the 
gun.115 The search continued and Richardson, who requested to go to 
the bathroom, was released from her handcuffs and escorted by one 
of the few female officers on the team.116 The bathroom had not been 
thoroughly searched, so the officer followed Richardson in and closed 
the door behind them.117 Without the officer asking any questions, 
Richardson confessed that the gun was hers.118 The officer brought 
another detective into the bathroom where Richardson again admit-
ted that the gun was hers.119 When the detective asked her to de-
scribe the weapon, she accurately told them that it was wrapped in a 
pink towel inside of a black purse, but she claimed that the weapon 
was for protection in her dangerous neighborhood.120 The search of 
the apartment continued; however, no other evidence was found.121 
The police decided to arrest Richardson for the illegal possession of a 
firearm, which Richardson confessed to owning for a third time prior 
to being taken away.122 
 The district court noted that the essential inquiry for determining 
custody is whether, given the circumstances surrounding the interro-
gation, a reasonable person would not have felt as if he or she was “at 
liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave.”123 This interpreta-
tion is at odds with the Court’s rationale in Howes. It was unlikely 
that, with fourteen armed law enforcement officers, either Richard-
son or Hill would have felt at liberty to terminate the interrogation 
and leave. In its analysis, the court determined that no single factor 
was dispositive; it stated, rather, that consideration should be given 
to the location and duration of the interrogation, the number of offic-
ers and citizens present, whether the suspects were handcuffed, and 
the tone and demeanor during the actual interrogation.124 
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858  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42:843 
 
B.   State Courts 
 The federal courts are not alone in their vague and often conflict-
ing application of custody. The state courts, too, have wrestled with 
the doctrine.125 The vast majority of the states still rely on the formal-
istic application of custody expressed in the Beheler decision. It is un-
clear whether the courts will adopt the broader interpretation of cus-
tody offered in Howes. It is clear, however, that a bright-line rule for 
arrest-like restraints will reach the same result, perhaps more clear-
ly and consistently, in the cases being decided, while mitigating the 
potential for the coercive pressures of concern in Miranda. Given the 
abundant and rather repetitious case law available throughout state 
courts, this Note will only briefly discuss some common illustrations 
and the issues they potentially raise. 
 In State v. Hieu Tran, the Vermont Supreme Court addressed 
whether a suspect was in custody when questioned in a police cruis-
er.126 Vermont police received information from a victim and witness-
es about an alleged assault and robbery that occurred during a drug 
transaction before questioning the suspect, Hieu Tran.127 Tran was 
not at his residence when the police arrived, so they followed his 
mother when she went to pick him up; once they returned, the police 
requested to speak with him inside of the police cruiser.128 One detec-
tive sat in the back seat, another sat in the driver’s seat, and Tran 
sat in the front passenger’s seat.129 Tran was never informed whether 
he was free to leave.130 The detectives questioned Tran for an hour; in 
that time, he made several incriminating statements, but at no point 
during the questioning was he informed of his Miranda rights.131 
Tran was arrested after the questioning.132 The trial court subse-
quently granted Tran’s motion to suppress.133 
 On an interlocutory appeal, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed 
the trial court’s decision to grant the motion to suppress, finding that 
the police conduct amounted to a custodial interrogation of the sus-
pect without the necessary Miranda warnings.134 The court identified 
several factors for consideration of custody determinations, including 
                                                                                                                                 
 125. The Fifth Amendment’s privilege against compulsory self-incrimination is protect-
ed from abridgement by the states by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment. Malloy v. Ho-
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(1) the location of the interview; (2) the interviewer’s communication 
to the suspect of his belief in the suspect’s guilt; (3) whether the sus-
pect arrives at the interview voluntarily; and (4) “whether the police 
told the suspect that he was free to terminate the interview at any 
point and leave.”135  
 The court applied these factors specifically to the case and deter-
mined that a coercive atmosphere was present during interroga-
tion.136 The court included in these factors an arrest-like restraint, 
namely the police cruiser.137 The closed, confined space of the police 
cruiser presented a potential for coercion.138 The court admitted that 
a suspect that is questioned in a car will not always be considered in 
custody; however, in this case, where the police chose to interview the 
suspect in the police cruiser rather than in his home and the suspect 
was not informed he was free to leave, custody was present and the 
suspect was entitled to Miranda warnings.139 
 The same year that the Vermont Supreme Court decided Hieu 
Tran, the Wisconsin Supreme Court also examined the question of 
arrest-like restraints in State v. Martin.140 In Martin, a Milwaukee 
police sergeant approached an intersection when he observed the 
suspect, Randy Martin, exit the driver’s side door of a vehicle, walk 
toward another vehicle, and shout to the driver of the other vehicle, 
to which the other driver responded.141 The other driver exited the 
vehicle, presumably to confront Martin, but noticed the sergeant and 
chose to remain near the vehicle.142 The sergeant witnessed Martin 
approach the other driver and pull out an item from his pocket.143 
The other driver motioned toward the sergeant and Martin placed 
the item back into his pocket. 144  The sergeant immediately sum-
moned Martin and placed him in handcuffs.145 The sergeant searched 
him and discovered an expandable baton.146 Two more police officers 
arrived on the scene to assist the sergeant; they ordered Martin’s 
friend out of Martin’s vehicle, searched the vehicle, and discovered a 
                                                                                                                                 
 135. Id. ¶ 12 (quoting State v. Muntean, 2010 VT 88, ¶ 19, 189 Vt. 50, 12 A.3d 518). 
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.22 caliber revolver.147 When the two men, neither of whom had re-
ceived Miranda warnings, were questioned about the gun, they both 
denied ownership.148 The sergeant placed Martin’s friend under ar-
rest for possession of a concealed weapon due to the fact it was dis-
covered underneath his seat, and after a brief exchange, Martin ad-
mitted that the gun was his.149 Despite this admission, one of the of-
ficers requested that Martin describe the gun; Martin did so accu-
rately and was arrested as a result.150 
 In its analysis, the Wisconsin Supreme Court first acknowledged 
that custody is present for purposes of Miranda where “a reasonable 
person would not feel free to terminate the interview and leave the 
scene.”151 The court further stated that handcuffs would not render a 
suspect in custody in all cases, such as cases involving “ ‘temporary 
roadside detention’ ”; however in this case, the sergeant had placed 
Martin in handcuffs for the purpose of arresting him for disorderly 
conduct.152 The court noted that under the totality of the circum-
stances test for custody determinations, courts consider whether the 
suspect was free to leave; the purpose, location, and duration of in-
terrogation; and the degree of restraint placed on the suspect.153 This 
illustrates a common confusion between the doctrines behind Terry 
and Miranda. 154  This Note’s proposed bright-line rule would not 
make the use of handcuffs during a lawful Terry stop unreasonable, 
but in those circumstances, the suspect should be considered in cus-
tody for purposes of Miranda. 
 In State v. Ortiz, the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas explicitly 
rejected the bright-line rule offered in this Note and yet affirmed 
both lower courts’ findings of custody where handcuffs were em-
ployed.155 In Ortiz, a police officer for the Lubbock County Sheriff’s 
Department was patrolling a highway when he pulled over Octavio 
Ortiz, the suspect in this case, for speeding.156 After brief questioning, 
the officer ordered Ortiz out of the car.157 Once outside of the vehicle, 
Ortiz was further questioned, and he revealed that he was traveling 
with his wife and that he was on probation for a previous drug pos-
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session charge.158 The officer then questioned the wife, and after her 
story conflicted with Ortiz’s, the officer called for backup and asked 
to search the vehicle, to which Ortiz consented.159 While the officer 
searched the vehicle, the backup officer who had just arrived began 
to frisk Ortiz’s wife.160 When she tried to avoid the search, the backup 
officer handcuffed her.161 After discovering something on Ortiz’s wife, 
one of the officers handcuffed Ortiz and asked him if he knew what it 
was; he admitted it was cocaine.162 The trial court suppressed Ortiz’s 
statements after finding that he was in custody when he admitted to 
the drugs and that the officers failed to read him his Miranda 
rights.163 On an interlocutory appeal, the court of appeals affirmed.164 
 On appeal, the Court of Criminal Appeals analyzed custody objec-
tively, considering whether a reasonable person would have viewed 
the detention as being a restraint on movement comparable to a for-
mal arrest.165 The court used a totality of the circumstances test to 
determine whether a reasonable person under the same circumstanc-
es would have believed his freedom of movement was restricted to a 
degree similar to formal arrest.166 It noted that the subjective belief of 
the officers was only relevant to the custody analysis if the officers 
manifested a belief to the individual being detained that he was in 
fact a suspect.167 In considering the factors in the case, the court went 
on to dispel any concern that the court of appeals had adopted a cate-
gorical rule for handcuffs that would automatically amount to custo-
dy.168 It expressly stated that “the court of appeals properly relied on 
handcuffing as only one of a range of relevant factors in its determi-
nation.”169 The court relied on the Howes test for custody—one of the 
few state opinions that has done so—in affirming the decision of the 
court of appeals.170 Ortiz was handcuffed immediately after viewing 
his wife get handcuffed and frisked.171 Based on the officers’ actions, 
Ortiz could have reasonably inferred that he was being associated 
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with the criminal behavior of his wife.172 The traffic stop had elevated 
into a custodial arrest in which Ortiz was entitled to Miranda 
rights.173 
 In all three cases, the same result arguably would have occurred if 
the courts had applied a bright-line rule for arrest-like restraints. 
The interpretation and analysis of custody varies only marginally in 
other opinions from other jurisdictions. However, the presence of ar-
rest-like restraints often has the same effect in those cases—the 
scales are tipped heavily in favor of finding custody. 
III.   ABANDONING A “TOTALITY OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES” 
TEST FOR A CLEAR, BRIGHT-LINE RULE 
 Miranda was intended to be a bright-line, prophylactic rule.174 
One of the principle rationales behind the Miranda opinion was to 
provide law enforcement and courts with clarity in the application of 
its rule.175 However, the various interpretations of custody across ju-
risdictions clearly demonstrate a growing need for further clarifica-
tion. The current totality of the circumstances test, even under 
Howes, only exacerbates the potential for contradictions and circuit 
splits. A bright-line rule with regards to finding custody when there 
are arrest-like restraints meets both aims of the original doctrine by 
being clear and simple while ensuring that police do not coerce sus-
pects into confessing.176 Additionally, a bright-line rule would relieve 
the courts of the task of analyzing each individual case.177  
 While it is difficult to establish a bright-line rule for custody that 
would not be over- or under-inclusive, it is possible for the courts to 
carve out a rule applicable to the circumstances described in the cas-
es in Part II. This is the area where the former test for custody under 
Beheler and the recent test for custody under Howes meet: arrest-like 
restraints. Under Howes, the Court distinguished arrest from custo-
dy, which under Beheler had been treated as functionally inter-
changeable. It has become readily apparent over the years that the 
concerns of Miranda over the potential for a coercive, police-
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dominated atmosphere during custodial interrogations can be pre-
sent whether or not the individual has been formally arrested. 
 The proposed bright-line rule to be applied is one that is relatively 
simple: any individual subjected to arrest-like restraints—such as 
being placed in handcuffs or into the back of a police car, or having 
weapons drawn on him—is in custody for purposes of Miranda. A 
court should then inquire whether the suspect was subjected to inter-
rogation for purposes of Miranda while in custody. It will not always 
be the case that a Miranda violation has occurred under the scope of 
this rule when a suspect has been subjected to arrest-like restraints. 
If a Miranda violation has occurred, then the burden will shift to the 
government, who is in a better position to prove that an exception to 
Miranda applies or that the statements should be excluded. 
 Even if a court were to find that a suspect is in custody, failing to 
apprise the suspect of his Miranda rights will not automatically bar 
the admissibility of evidence obtained through interrogation. It can-
not be overstated that the Court has reaffirmed the core holding of 
Miranda as a constitutional decision that is subject to several excep-
tions.178 These exceptions allow for the establishment of a bright-line 
rule in Fifth Amendment jurisprudence. 
 It was not long after Miranda established safeguards against the 
inherent coerciveness of custodial interrogation that the Court began 
establishing exceptions to its general rule. In analyzing the rationale 
behind Miranda, the Court has found that certain circumstances are 
not covered by the general rule because the coercive pressures are 
not likely to be present. The Miranda opinion specifically acknowl-
edged that the Fifth Amendment does not bar statements freely vol-
unteered, allowing for their admissibility whether or not warnings 
were given.179 The bright-line rule proposed in this Note would only 
be sufficient to establish custody and would not detract from the in-
quiry of whether there was interrogation. If a suspect were to be 
placed in handcuffs and immediately confess before any questioning 
has occurred, it would be unlikely that the confession would be ex-
cluded under any analysis. Similarly, the Fifth Amendment does not 
extend its protections to the examination of real, physical evidence, 
because there is no communicative act by the suspect.180  
 If the concerns over adopting a bright-line rule in favor of pre-
sumptive custody for cases involving arrest-like restraints are that it 
would exclude more evidence and serve as a straightjacket in police 
                                                                                                                                 
 178. See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 441 (2000).  
 179. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478 (1966). 
 180. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 765 (1966) (holding that petitioner’s 
blood sample was not a communicative act of the petitioner and therefore presented no 
concern of “testimonial compulsion”). 
864  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42:843 
 
work, the actual application of the exclusionary rule181 should ease 
those concerns. The exclusionary rule serves as a deterrent against 
negligent and bad police conduct.182 However, this assumes that the 
police acted in bad faith and as a result an individual was deprived of 
his or her constitutional rights.183  A suspect’s constitutional right 
against self-incrimination is violated by the introduction of unwarned 
statements against him or her at trial, not by the failure to inform 
the suspect of his rights.184 When the police negligently, or even de-
liberately, fail to provide Miranda warnings to a suspect, any state-
ments made in violation of Miranda may be excluded, but the “physi-
cal fruit” obtained by the statements will not.185 This denotes an im-
portant limitation within Fifth Amendment privilege: it is only appli-
cable to self-incrimination.186 Additionally, the mere failure to inform 
a suspect of his Miranda rights does not exclude the physical evi-
dence obtained from those statements, because the Fifth Amend-
ment’s focus on protecting against self-incrimination is limited to tes-
timonial evidence.187 
 The proposed bright-line rule works well with the exceptions to 
provide law enforcement with clarity in decision-making and reme-
dies for potential Miranda violations. The police may potentially re-
move a suspect from custody by removing the arrest-like restraint or, 
more logically, by providing the suspect with Miranda warnings. 
Even in a situation where a suspect is subjected to arrest-like re-
straints, not read Miranda warnings, and subsequently makes in-
criminating statements during interrogation, all is not lost for obtain-
ing evidence from that suspect specifically. So long as the police acted 
in good faith, they could administer Miranda warnings and any 
statements made thereafter would likely be admissible, assuming 
that they were made voluntarily.188  
                                                                                                                                 
 181. The exclusionary rule is a judicially created remedy that operates to deter consti-
tutional violations. Jack A. Levy, The Exclusionary Rule, 85 GEO. L.J. 969, 970 (1997). 
When applied, it bars the government from introducing evidence obtained in violation of 
the defendant’s constitutional rights into the prosecution’s case-in-chief. Id. at 969-70. 
 182. Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 447 (1974). 
 183. See id. 
 184. See United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630, 643-44 (2004) (holding that a police 
officer’s failure to warn a suspect of his Miranda rights during an arrest did not warrant 
suppression at trial of a weapon discovered through the suspect’s statements). 
 185. Id. at 644. 
 186. The “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine is applicable only where a constitutional 
violation has occurred. Michael A. Cantrell, Constitutional Penumbras and Prophylactic 
Rights: The Right to Counsel and the “Fruit of the Poisonous Tree”, 40 AM. J. CRIM. L. 111, 
115-16 (2013). A Miranda violation is not necessarily a constitutional violation because the 
rule provided by Miranda is not in the text of the Fifth Amendment. Id.  
 187. See Patane, 542 U.S. at 643-44. 
 188. See Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 318 (1985) (“[A] suspect who has once re-
sponded to unwarned yet uncoercive questioning is not thereby disabled from waiving his 
2015]  APPLYING THE ’CUFFS 865 
 
 Even in cases where there has been a Miranda violation, the ex-
clusionary rule has not been applied with strict force. The statements 
are still admissible for the purpose of impeachment on the rationale 
that Miranda does not grant a criminal defendant the right to com-
mit perjury.189  Certainly nothing in a bright-line rule would affect 
the exception for impeachment. 
 Out of the several exceptions to Miranda, arguably none play as 
large of a role in Fifth Amendment custody determinations as the 
public safety exception. For that reason, it may remedy the potential 
issues of over- and under-inclusiveness present in the proposed 
bright-line rule in this Note. The Court held in New York v. Quarles 
that law enforcement officers could forego Miranda warnings in exi-
gent circumstances where the “threat to the public safety outweighs 
the need for the prophylactic rule protecting the Fifth Amendment’s 
privilege against self-incrimination.”190 The rationale behind the pub-
lic safety exception is that police should not be placed in a position 
where they will have to make judgment calls, often under pressure 
and time constraints, of whether to issue the suspect warnings or 
take the chance that some probative evidence may then be rendered 
inadmissible.191 In such situations, an arrest-like restraint offers po-
lice the best option to neutralize any threat the suspect may impose, 
but it seldom would neutralize all threats imposed in that situation. 
This would not detract from the fact that the suspect is in custody for 
purposes of Miranda, but the government would not be penalized as 
a result of the exception. 
 The public safety exception should have some limitations such 
that it will not to render this Note’s proposed rule or Miranda, for 
that matter, ineffectual. The public safety exception is generally con-
cerned with the welfare of the public; therefore, where the premises 
have been secured and the suspect(s) no longer pose any direct 
threats to officer safety, any pre-Miranda questioning should fall 
outside of the scope of Quarles.192 Under this application, the excep-
tion and the rule complement one another, balancing policy concerns 
of effective and efficient policing with the protection of individual 
constitutional rights. 
                                                                                                                                 
rights and confessing after he has been given the requisite Miranda warnings.”). But see 
Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 622 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“If the deliberate 
two-step strategy has been used, postwarning statements that are related to the substance 
of prewarning statements must be excluded unless curative measures are taken before the 
postwarning statement is made.”). 
 189. Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 225-26 (1971). 
 190. 467 U.S. 649, 657 (1984). 
 191. Id. at 657-58. 
 192. Rorie A. Norton, Matters of Public Safety and the Current Quarrel Over the Scope 
of the Quarles Exception to Miranda, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 1931, 1961-62 (2010).  
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CONCLUSION 
 This Note’s proposed bright-line rule in favor of presuming custo-
dy in cases involving arrest-like restraints would provide for con-
sistency in custody determinations across jurisdictions and would 
further the aim of Miranda: protecting Fifth Amendment privilege 
against self-incrimination during inherently coercive custodial inter-
rogations. 193  Moreover, law enforcement and courts would benefit 
from clarity in the application of the rule, while avoiding the over- 
and under-inclusiveness that traditionally plague bright-line rules as 
a result of the established exceptions to Miranda. Even under the 
current Howes test for custody, it is likely that a court would find 
custody where arrest-like restraints are employed. It is therefore rea-
sonable for the United States Supreme Court to adopt this Note’s 
proposed bright-line rule. 
                                                                                                                                 
 193. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478-79 (1966) (“Procedural safeguards must 
be employed to protect the [Fifth Amendment] privilege.”). 
